Firstly, positive word-of-mouth (WOM) plays a crucial role in memory-based decision-making. Vivid WOM, such as face-to-face communication, is more effective than pallid forms, like printed information, boosting the chances that consumers will favour later entrants while reducing their consideration for early entrants. Secondly, brand similarity also influences outcomes. While high similarity between early and later entrants generally benefits the early entrant due to consumer familiarity, strong positive WOM can shift the advantage toward later entrants by enhancing their credibility. Last but not least, the decision-making context further shapes these dynamics. In memory-based tasks, early entrants often benefit from stronger recall, but in stimulus-based decisions, where direct brand comparisons are possible, the advantage may shift, giving later entrants a better chance to stand out.

Based on the key findings, certain managerial implications could be drawn. Firstly, managers of late-entrant brands should prioritise generating and amplifying positive word-of-mouth (WOM) to increase their chances of being considered and chosen by consumers. This can be achieved by delivering strong customer experiences, fostering community engagement, and leveraging influencers to promote authentic brand interactions. It’s also important to avoid positioning the late-entrant brand too similarly to the early entrant unless there is strong positive WOM supporting it, as high brand similarity tends to favour the market leader. Instead, late entrants should focus on differentiating themselves through unique features, innovation, or alternative value propositions. Thirdly, in industries with highly differentiated brands, such as luxury versus budget markets, these insights may be less relevant, as consumers typically do not see the brands as direct competitors, reducing the impact of similarity and WOM.

The article comes with its own set of limitations, particularly in markets for low-involvement, low-risk products (e.g., paper towels or toothpaste), where word-of-mouth (WOM) and brand similarity have less influence. In these markets, consumers prioritise convenience, price, and availability over brand differentiation, reducing the impact of WOM. Overused or biassed WOM, such as excessive influencer promotions or paid endorsements, also loses effectiveness, leading to consumer scepticism. Furthermore, the use of student-based experiments can create biassed results, as they may not represent the general population. Additionally, the effectiveness of positive WOM varies by industry, with low effects seen in sectors like luxury, where consumers don’t view brands as direct competitors.

Finally, to offer further insights into the topic of the paper, two additional articles were suggested. The first article: Lim, J. S., & Bhargava, M. (2020). How Digital Word-of-Mouth Affects Consumer Decision-Making. Management Science, 66(5)
It explores how online reviews, recommendations, and ratings influence consumer choices, particularly in the e-commerce space. The study reveals that eWOM plays a significant role in reducing the perceived risk and enhancing consumer confidence, making it a crucial factor in the modern digital economy​
The second article Lisjak, M., Bonezzi, A., & Rucker, D. D. (2021). How Marketing Perks Influence Word of Mouth. Journal of Marketing, 85(5), 128-144 examines how marketing perks like rewards and exclusive offers affect WOM behavior. It finds that valuable perks enhance WOM by boosting consumers’ self-image, while transactional or manipulative perks reduce authentic WOM. The study highlights the importance of aligning perks with consumer motivations to encourage positive WOM.

With regards to the implications of the findings presented in this paper, what stands out as interesting is that pioneers operating in hostile environments should focus on differentiating their product portfolio rather than increasing prices to achieve high growth rates. Managers should therefore aim to create a relatively smaller number of distinctive products (compared to competitors) by limiting their product line to ensure a tight fit with the market and to best address growth potentials. For pioneers operating in benign environments, managers appear to experience the most growth when they do not exercise extensive control over distribution channels. Managers should therefore consider allowing their distribution channel members more autonomy while concentrating on expanding the number of channels. For followers in hostile environments, managers should seek to reduce their cost structures and follow low-price strategies to compete more effectively with pioneers on a price basis. The adoption of advanced process technologies can positively impact cost structures in this regard. On the other hand, followers operating in benign environments are faced with less cost pressure on the production side and might want to put more of their resources into the development of differentiated products or services to seize untouched market demand.

The following situations are some of the cases where the key insights do not apply, having a wider distribution network is a critical success factor for pioneers in benign environments according to the paper. Contrary to this, Tesla’s distribution network is narrow, but it is still successful for a pioneer in a benign environment. Distribution network is a tradeoff in vertical integration, if a company chooses to maintain control over the supply chain to maintain quality and brand image it will opt for a narrow distribution network, but it still provides conditions for growth. Next, regarding wider distribution network benefitting pioneer more the followers in a benign environment we can find an exception in the Chinese e-commerce market. Alibaba was the pioneer in the market connecting the buyers and sellers of products on an online platform. But JD.com, a follower, was able to overtake Alibaba by having better, wider and reliable distribution/delivery channels. This is because the distribution network is the critical winning factor in the e-commerce industry and is important for all players. Finally, the paper gives the insight that a pioneer in a hostile environment uses more advanced technology and processes. This is not true in cases of radical innovation, which allows followers to overtake the pioneer. For example, Google beat and overtook Yahoo, the pioneer in the search engine industry, in its search engine performance and market share by using critical innovations.

From these exceptions we can see that the key insights, although useful, should not and cannot be applied to all situations. This is because the importance of the factors highlighted would differ for each industry and we must understand how the competitive and environmental forces interact while developing strategy.

We identified the following video & article, which we believe give further insights into the effects of market entry order: “The Half-Truth of First Mover Advantage. Northeastern University” (2018) and “Pioneer, Early Follower or Late Entrant: Entry Dynamics with Learning and Market Competition European Economic Review” (Chen, C., Ishida, J., & Mukherjee, A., 2023). The video provides support for timing tradeoffs and efficiency gains for late market entrants while the article, on the other hand, establishes a unified framework for the tradeoffs faced by potential new entrants based on pre-entry learning and post-entry market competition.

Firstly, a key insight of the paper is that behavioral mechanisms are essential to each rational approach.  As the paper does not explicitly define the rational approach, we clarify it as a logical process of decision-making that consistently has an underlying reason. The behavioral approach uses insights from psychology to explain how, when and why humans may behave in certain ways (Economicseducation, 2023). Secondly, business strategy does not offer straightforward optimum solutions due to its inherent complexity. The bounded human rationality limits the specification of the problem itself and the evaluation of all the alternatives possible. The third key insight is that to address complex strategic problems, rationality must be seen as a process. This consists of two steps: the first being the simplification of the actual reality into “Small World Representations” (Levinthal, 2011), and the second the preservation of ambiguity regarding action-outcome linkages. 

Based on these insights, several implications can be drawn for managers. First of all, decision-makers are encouraged to diversify their knowledge input. To do this, managers are advised to seek a broad spectrum of opinions and information. The implication of a broad input of information, as derived from the key insights, can indeed mitigate risks associated with behavioral biases, e.g., the overconfidence bias or the herd mentality bias. Another implication is to be flexible and adaptable in strategic decision-making. Moreover, to further promote these values, managers should foster an organizational culture that values flexibility, adaptability, and feedback from others. Walmart’s failed market entry in Germany is evidence of the risks of rigid strategies and not adapting to the respective situation. Finally, managers should use a goal structure that aligns with the ability of the decision-maker to make trade-offs among outcomes. In particular, if they can make such trade-offs it is recommended to use a comprehensive goal structure that entails several sub-goals. On the other hand, if they cannot make such trade-offs, decision-makers would be better off using a simpler goal structure focused on one specific goal.

Nonetheless, it is important to consider that there are also limitations to such implications and to the article itself. The process of diversifying knowledge can indeed lead to decision-making paralysis if managers find themselves overwhelmed by the amount of information. Additionally, while promoting adaptability and flexibility, it is essential to keep the vision of the organization in mind, ensuring that strategies remain anchored to a consistent overarching goal. Another limitation is that the article does not consider the relation between rationality in strategic decision-making and the time span available to take a decision.

Finally, to offer further insights into the topic of the paper, two additional articles were suggested. The first article: Scholten W., de Vries F., Besieux T. (2022). A Better Approach to Avoiding Misconduct. Harvard Business Review. https://hbr.org/2022/05/a-better-approach-to-avoiding-misconduct.

It discusses the challenge of preventing misconduct in financial firms and introduces the concept of behavioral risk management, emphasizing the influence of risk factors on workplace behavior. It shares a common focus with Levinthal’s paper, emphasizing the significance of understanding and addressing human behavior in organizational strategies.

The second article: Nobre, F. C., Machado, M. J. C., & Nobre, L. H. N. (2022). Behavioral biases and the decision-making in entrepreneurs and managers. Journal of Contemporary Administration, 26(Sup. 1). https://doi.org/10.1590/1982-7849rac2022200369.en

It explores the impact of behavioral biases on the decision-making abilities of managers and entrepreneurs by focusing on the context of investment decisions. It complements Levinthal’s work by delving into the practical implications of behavioral biases in real-world decision-making scenarios.

This article mainly assesses the learning curve effects observed in the manufacturing industry, which are usually computed as the fact that an industry reduces its costs by a Ratio (p) when it doubles its cumulative production. Argote and Epple assess the differences observed in learning curve effects within the same industries. While differences in learning rates should be observed in industries producing different kinds of products, the authors note that this difference is often more dominant in organizations making the same products. The article then denotes potential reasons explaining those fluctuations and affirms that they are mainly due to Organizational forgetting, Turnover, Transfer of knowledge (from products and/or organizations), and Economies of Scale. Furthermore, Argote and Epple explain that first-mover advantage can be countered by companies entering the market later and taking advantage of the learnings of the first mover (before organizations begin with production).

These insights can have managerial implications, mainly three that could allow managers to avoid “knowledge depreciation,” which would negatively influence learning curve effects. Firstly, the jobs and procedures should be routinized to prevent organizational forgetting. That would reduce the dependency a company has on a few specific individuals (e.g., experts in a task). Moreover, routinizing jobs and procedures also helps reduce the costs related to training new employees and reduces the time needed to onboard them in the company. Secondly, it would be relevant to implement robust management systems capable of optimizing the transfer of productivity gains. That would require the development of more standardized processes across the production, allowing the capture and preservation of knowledge without losing it in the event of the departure of a skilled employee. Moreover, cross-functional collaboration should be fostered, ensuring knowledge sharing and retention between functions across the organization. And thirdly, it would be advised that the organizations implement knowledge performance metrics and benchmarking, guaranteeing a regular assessment of the employees regarding their level of knowledge. That means that employees should be assessed frequently to allow the management to check the level of knowledge across the organization and take appropriate measures. In addition, it would be relevant to benchmark the organization’s performance against industry leaders and best practices to identify areas where improvements can be made.

Although this article provides many valuable elements, it is limited to some extent. First, this article was written by Argote and Epple in 1990. Even if some features stayed the same in the past 30 years, it is to be considered that the data used and the findings can be outdated if we compare them with the actual industry standards. Indeed, this article focuses its results on the production of discrete products (e.g., planes, boats, etc). That was the main focus at that time, but since then the research evolved and included continuous process industries and new implications were derived. Furthermore, the actual research added more outcome measures (I.e., more than the traditional labor hours). A second limitation that can be noted is that the article, to some extent, focuses on the “learning of employees” (e.g., in the chapter related to turnover). Recent research showed that while learning the labor force was contributing to learning curve effects, it was relatively marginal. The aspects of how the company is organized and its access to technology are nowadays more considered and could be added to the article of Argote and Epple to complete it.

To conclude, we can refer to two articles that provide an updated view of the learning curve effect and that were also used for the present research. The first article [1], partially written by Linda Argote (one of the same authors of the text we analyzed), develops the new trends in the research on learning curve effects and provides a good update on the analyzed articles. The second article [2] also provides updated insights on the learning curve topic but specifically focuses on production. Besides, this article wraps up and analyzes relevant literature on the subject and, therefore, represents a good way to enhance the research on the topic with further lectures.

REFERENCES:

[1] Argote, L., Lee, S., & Park, J. (2021). Organizational Learning Processes and Outcomes : Major findings and future research directions. Management Science, 67(9), 5399‑5429. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2020.3693

[2] Glock, C. H., Grosse, E. H., Jaber, M. Y., & Smunt, T. L. (2019). Applications of Learning Curves in Production and Operations Management : A Systematic Literature review. Computers & Industrial Engineering, 131, 422‑441. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cie.2018.10.030

The article, by Anthony, Eyring & Gibson (2006) [1] aspires to elaborate a plan for a company to create and define its innovation strategy.

Key insights

One of the main points of the article is that, according to the authors, disruptive innovations is the type of innovation that can create the most potential for growth. While incumbent companies tend to turn to incremental innovations to not go too far away from their core business, the authors say that disruptive innovations could create more growth. Another important insight is that, when assessing innovation projects, companies should focus on patterns instead of numbers. Using financial estimates early would be inaccurate and would tend to choose projects in large and measurable markets which are actually markets that are often hostile to disruptive innovation. Finally, a last key insight is that adaptation and flexibility is key and the mantra “invest a little, learn a lot” can help being adaptable.

Key actions

The first key action would be to clarify what the company won’t do and to use what is called the playbook for disruptive innovations. This means combining both a list of innovation characteristics that worked in the past with four criteria to which a successful innovation strategy should conform to. This enables companies to access a customized list of questions/elements that the innovation should conform to that represents the market’s idiosyncrasies. Second, to avoid having to use precise financial estimates, companies can play the “Game of zeros”. This implies trying to estimate whether the project will generate a 6, 7 or 8 “0” revenue. Third, providing fast passes to innovation projects can enable companies to capture fast trends and avoid complicated processes of approval as to quickly put a product on the market and cut the competition short.

Limitations

A limitation of this paper is that it states that disruptive innovations create the most potential for growth. However, incremental innovation is always a big factor of successful companies. It then depends on in which market you play and on if you are already implemented or not. A second limitation is that some companies, for example NGO’s, might not want to play the game of zeros but rather use other metrics more suited to what they are looking for. Ultimately, a last limitation is that for some industries such as renewable energy, “invest a little, learn a lot” has to be “invest a lot, learn a lot”, since it is not possible to learn and progress significantly without making large investments first.

Further references

In the first additional article [2], the authors highlight the importance of creating a culture centred on innovation, an adhocracy culture, to promote flexibility, risk taking and to allow the company to innovate. The last article [3] mentions that it is capital to implement an ambidextrous approach to innovation. They state that a company can face two types of contexts: either normal periods or black swans which are disruptive events. They underline the importance of being ready to face these disruptive events but also to compete in calmer periods.

References

[1] Anthony, S. D., Eyring, M., & Gibson, L. (2006). Mapping your innovation strategy. Harvard Business Review, 84(5), 104-13.
[2] Chatzoglou, P. and Chatzoudes, D. (2018), “The role of innovation in building competitive advantages: an empirical investigation”, European Journal of Innovation Management, 21(1), pp. 44-69. https://doi.org/10.1108/EJIM-02-2017-0015
[3] Calandro, J., & Paharia, V. (2019). Disruptive technologies, “Black Swans” and corporate innovation strategy. Strategy & Leadership. DOI:10.1108/BIJ-08-2020-0443

The paper presents the question of undergoing exploration or exploitation among S&P 500 companies and how it affects their financial performance. Exploratory activities are defined as, “search, variation, risk-taking, experimentation, play, flexibility, discovery, innovation” and exploitation activities are defined as, “refinement, choice, production, efficiency, selection, implementation, execution”. The paper discovered a positive curvilinear relationship between companies that focus on exploratory activities and their financial performance, measured in terms of market capitalization. This is most significant in industries with relatively high R&D spending, whereas in industries with relatively low R&D, the benefit is negligible. Another point indicated in the paper is that the best financial results were achieved by companies having a balance between exploratory and exploitation activities. The paper also points out that the majority of companies, across all sectors, engage in below optimum exploratory activities.

The major managerial implication of this paper regards the importance of exploration, which fosters entrepreneurial opportunity recognition and creates capabilities for staying viable in environmental changes. In line with previous research, the paper concludes that big corporations overemphasize exploitation. Results suggest that the presence of explorative activities and the right balance between explorative and exploitative activities has a relatively higher impact on financial performance for firms operating in environments with higher technological dynamism. To make viable financial and strategic decisions, firms should therefore assess two parts of their environment- the internal and external. The internal environment should be assessed in terms of the relative part of business activities constituting explorative versus exploitative activities. The article provides different examples of methods from earlier studies regarding this, e.g., resource allocation, surveying key personnel, and quantifying variables surrounding a firm’s technological search activities, although these have limited generalizability.

In the next step, firms should assess the environment in terms of frequency of technological change, impacting the rate of obsolescence of competencies and resources and thus the need for exploration. If adopting the implications to a corporate group, managers could further adopt a holistic view resource devotion to the corporate group, as firms operating in less R&D and technology environments could benefit from the long-term performances of explorative activities happening in other parts of the portfolio. However, again, the major implication the article provides is that managers should ensure enough relative devotion to explorative activities in parts of the corporate portfolio which is surrounded by more technological and R&D activities and change. It should however be noted that the paper does not clarify if the balance of explorative and exploitative activities is set to the industry or fixed.

Further, each paper comes with a few limitations per se. In the case of our paper, we identified 3 main limitations that readers should be aware of when reading the paper. Those three limitations are three attention points when trying to apply the main insights of the paper to other companies. First, there’s the question of the size of the company concerned. The article sticks to analyzing very big companies, part of the S&P 500, while 99% of the Business in the Western World are SME’s, and while 6 to 8 on 10 people worldwide work for those SME’s. Second, there’s the time period question. The study addresses data covering period 1989-2004. We are nearly 20 years later, and the game has changed, due to different innovations & macro trends (IT, Energetic Transition, …). Finally, there’s the question of the geographic location, with this study being conducted only in the US. A reader working in Europe or Asia should so be aware of the specificities of this market before trying to replicate the model to his own market.

Regarding further references, the first article investigated the notions of exploration and exploitation in times of crisis with different small and medium-sized companies in order to measure their impacts on the performance of these companies. They then created a framework to examine these two concepts and finally concluded that the severity of crisis a firm is exposed to acts as a positive contingency for the impact of exploration on firm performance level and variability, and as a negative contingency for exploitation’s level and variability effects. The last paper investigated the trade-off between exploration and exploitation and the role of absorptive capacity; The article argues that ambidexterity is not always effective and that sometimes a specialization in exploitation or exploration is way better than trying to do a trade-off; We chose that article because it allows managers to know what strategy to apply, ambidexterity or specialization.

Innovation myopia is common, and it leads to missed opportunities and missed competitive advantages. Innovation myopia is having a mistaken view of what innovation is and its scope. That can lead to companies looking alike and competing on similar innovation, losing all the benefits of it, while innovation should allow companies to gain a sustainable competitive advantage and give value to the customers.

Innovation is possible along all business dimensions of the innovation radar framework. This framework is based on the 4 key dimensions of a business: what (the offerings), who (the customers), how (the process used), and where (their presence). Alongside 8 additional business dimensions (platform, solutions, customer experience, value capture, organization, supply chain, networking, and brand), firms can use this framework to guide their innovations.

Innovation is a complete integrated system. In other words, innovation along one business dimension can impact the other dimensions both positively and negatively.

Managerial implications

From an internal point of view, the radar framework is a very useful tool to evaluate where a company stands in terms of innovation, and which dimensions are already tackled, or not. When putting an innovation in place, it also enables the managers to evaluate the overall impact of this change, which of course should be positive on each of the dimensions. Finally, and depending on what was discovered, managers could find new innovative opportunities to grow and develop their business.

Secondly, a company could benchmark its innovation profile with the innovation profiles of its competitors. By benchmarking innovation profiles, a firm could identify the strengths and weaknesses of its competitors with regards to innovation. In addition, it could determine the dimensions in which no one of its competitors is innovating and analyze whether it would bring customer value. It could enable a company to acquire a sustainable competitive advantage and change the nature of competition.

The Limitations

One limitation identified is within the innovation radar framework itself. While the framework addresses the key questions of what, who, how and where through the 12 dimensions of business innovation, it fails to address the timing of innovation. Due to first- and second-mover advantages and disadvantages, the timing of innovation is a critical aspect that managers need to consider. To address this limitation, managers should consistently benchmark their innovation profile against other competitors to decide when to capitalize on opportunities, and when to avoid innovation myopia.

A second limitation is about sustainability. While firms should innovate when it creates value for customers and the firm, considering potential negative externalities that could be created in that process is also important in innovation. Sustainable innovation (“innovation that reconcile economic, environmental and social goals”) could be an alternative form of innovation that companies could pursue. We recommend managers to include sustainability in the decision process of innovation.

Also, the organization culture was not tackled in the article but represents an important element to make sure innovation will be encouraged, supported, and then will bring results to the company. Educating people about that and make it part of the core business is indeed crucial to involve them in the process and to make the changes work.

To achieve this right balance, managers can follow this three steps methodology. They first have to understand what they should focus on: exploration of exploitation as well as the factors that make the balance lean one way or the other. Factors such as the frequency and significance of changes happening in the firm’s industry, the type of market in which the firm competes – slow or fast-cycle – and lastly, the firm’s resources and capabilities must be taken into account. Secondly, once they have correctly analyzed these factors, managers are able to determine how to balance their resources. Last but not least, re-introduce middle-level managers. Indeed, they play two crucial roles in Strategic Entrepreneurship.

There are several mechanisms to foster exploration and exploitation. Operationally, the best way to boost exploitation is by focusing on internal development, as individuals within the firm have intimate knowledge about products and processes that just need to be stimulated. M&A can increase firms’ knowledge and resources and thus develop exploration. It can also lead to gaining more control over the supply chain, synergies, hence fostering exploitation. Structurally, decentralized authority and semi-formalized processes are three factors that enhance exploration processes in a company, providing autonomy to individuals and allowing them to pursue a larger number of opportunities. On the other hand, a centralized structure and highly specialized and formalized routines foster exploitation. Culturally, firms promoting experimentation will promote exploration, while certainty in tasks and outcomes, specific and short term goals, and a focus on capabilities will shift the focus on exploitation.

However the implication of those findings also presents some constraints; in other words operational, structural, and cultural limits. Operationally, M&A could not foster exploration or exploitation when there is too much imbalance between the size of the companies. The risk for a small company is to get eaten by a bigger one which only aimed at killing competition by buying the smaller one. Structurally, some firms might aim at a perfectly flat structure. For instance, Buurtzorg’s employees directly report to the CEO. Therefore, implementing mid-level managers might not be relevant since that would be inconsistent with the needs and the strategy of the company. Culturally, a firm might not allow employees to access some data due to confidentiality which makes launching new experimentation more difficult. While firms’ administrative inadaptability could make the process slow due to paperwork, it is also not certain that employees will be willing to use an experimentation environment.

The following two articles are offering further insights into 2 interesting topics related to strategic entrepreneurship. Firstly, the effect of the CEO’s regulatory focus on the level of engagement in exploration and exploitation in a firm is discussed. Secondly, the dangers of making the leap from exploitation to exploration are considered.

Kammerlander, N., Burger, D., Fust, A., & Fueglistaller, U. (2015). Exploration and Exploitation in Established Small and Medium-sized Enterprises: The Effect of CEOs’ Regulatory Focus. Journal Of Business Venturing, 30(4), 582-602.

Swift, T. (2015). The perilous leap between exploration and exploitation. Strategic Management Journal.

This paper, written by Elena Vidal and Will Mitchel in 2013, aims at explaining why first entrants on a market often fail, and the strategies that could help them survive.

There are three main reasons why first entrants often fail:
– They face difficulties determining the customer needs, hence offering features that do not meet customer expectations.
– It is very challenging to create sustainable barriers to entry for new entrants. First movers lack proper IP protection.
– Despite having strong core competencies, first entrants lack the complementary resources needed to support their full business model. Competitors can move much faster in this area and replicate the successful resources without many of the failures.

MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS

There are two managerial implications for companies aiming to survive as first entrants on a market :

– The company needs to possess both core and complementary resources. By mastering those types of resources, it has a greater chance of long term survival and financial success. It can acquire those resources by luck, by having a founder with relevant prior experience or by outsourcing the acquisition of those resources.

– The company needs to be aware of its potential competitors and to have a view of its set of resources. There are three different scenarios that may occur if the company only possesses core competencies:
– The best case scenario for a first entrant is if the competitor has neither core nor complementary resources as it gives time for the company to develop a full business model. In this case, the company should develop its complementary resources internally.
– The worst case scenario is if the competitor has both core and complementary resources so that it will be able to make a better entrance and compete quite rapidly against the first entrant. In that case, the company should avoid entering first and learn from the entry of another competitor.
– The two intermediate scenarios are when competitors have either core or complementary resources. The outcome is quite uncertain for the first entrant. In those cases, the company should acquire complementary resources externally in order to be much faster.

LIMITATIONS

One limit of the paper is that it does not address the fact that a company can possess both core and complementary resources, and still fail. Sometimes it is not only about having the resources, but also about the efficiency to implement them, the speed to cope with the market and the vision of the top management.

Another limit of this article is that the market environment is also important for the success of an early entrant. Indeed, some companies do not possess complementary resources, but they succeed because of strong barriers to entry, while others benefit from regulations allowing them to lead a market without the need to innovate.

FURTHER REFERENCES

Yao, X., Zhang, P., Lu, X. , & Huang, L.(2020). Early or Late? Entry timing in online IT service markets and the moderating effects of market characteristics. Journal of Business Research,114,265-277. : Entry timing has a U-shaped effect on a firm’s performance in the online IT services market.

Klingebiel, R., & Joseph, J.(2016). Entry Timing and Innovation Strategy in Feature Phones. Strategic Management Journal, 37(6), 1002–1020. : The alignment between entry timing and strategy is crucial.

Besharat, A., Langan, R.J, Nguyen, C.G.(2015).Fashionably late: Strategies for competing against a pioneer advantage. Journal of Business Research, 69(2), 718-725. : Late entrants can either compete on new attributes or pre-existing ones, depending on the value of those attributes.